A member of the city council who made defamatory statements at the city council meeting regarding one of the council members contended that it was a lawful publication with complete immunity because it was done within the framework of a permit from the competent authority.
The Supreme Court held that the things said are not immune under the law because they were not done under an order of a competent authority or under a permit, but other possible defenses should be reviewed, such as: the defense of good faith. Defamation is, inter alia, a publication that may humiliate a person in the eyes of others or demean the person due to acts, behavior or traits attributed to him. However, Israeli Law provides protection to the publisher of defamation, inter alia, when the publication is made under an instruction of an authorized authority or under a permit of an authorized authority (including some corporate board of directors meetings, but not if they are superficially outside the meeting agenda and were not said in relation to the issue in discussion, in which case the good faith defense will not be afforded). Here, no specific "instruction" or "permission" was given to say the defamatory statements that were said, except for the general permission to speak in the matter on the agenda and concerning the candidacy of the council member for a certain position. Things said by council members or public servants during a council meeting do not confer absolute privilege on "everything" said at the meeting regarding that subject, but may be protected if they were made in good faith to protect an interest that is their "personal lawful matter", as who were required to participate in the decision-making process on the subject.